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Theodore Bennett’s Cuts and Criminality analyses the power of discourse in shaping 
the legal regulation of human bodies. He contends that the ‘criminal law does not 
construct its divisions between lawful and criminal body alterations in an arbitrary 
way’.1 Rather the legal regulation of bodies is ‘patterned around certain 
conceptualisations and understandings about the body and about society that find 
authoritative purchase within legal discourse’.2 It is this claim that Bennett seeks to 
demonstrate in his book – the ‘underlying goal of this analysis is to lay bare the 
operational techniques of law and discourse’3 and, consequently, ‘denaturalise the 
restrictions that law places on our relations to our bodies and open up room within 
legal discourse to allow for the possibility of a broader ranges of embodied 
expression’.4 So how does Bennett go about achieving this? 
He first sets out the two theoretical frameworks that are used to perform the 
analysis – postmodernist and discourse theory. The key ingredients from each theory 
in forming an analytical framework concern the status of discourse and truth. From 
postmodernist theory Bennett focuses ‘on subjectivity [which] allows the law to be 
read as a system of internal truth-production’5 rather than reading the law as reflecting 
‘(purportedly) “objective” principles such as justice, fairness or the grundnorm’.6 
Consequently, Bennett is not seeking ‘to find, bring to light and reconcile “hidden 
truths” about bodies that are submerged by the operations of law and discourse’.7 
From discourse theory Bennett contextualises the particular discursive contours of law 
– ‘thus [legal discourse is] sufficiently separate to be recognised as an individual 
discursive formation, but it is not separate enough to be free from the influence of 
other dominant discourses’8. The ‘value of discourse theory comes in recognising that 
discursive formations are not merely representational, they are also productive’9. The 
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‘law does not passively represent or reproduce social phenomena’10 rather ‘legal 
discourse actively constructs a particular model of reality’.11 This theoretical 
framework allows Bennett to treat the law as a form of truth-production within the 
context of recognised/marginalised discursive formations and so expose the power 
structures between these formations which lead to particular legal regimes.  
Bennett applies this analytical framework to the regulation of bodies and, in 
particular, body alterations. From the perspective of postmodernist and discourse 
theory the ‘body does not just display the marks of its struggle with external social 
forces, rather the body is itself the site where cultural knowledge is worked through, 
negotiated, (re)produced and/or challenged’12. Thus bodies are ‘both inscriptive and 
active’13 and ‘body alterations constitute important battlegrounds within this 
conflict’14 between external society and the individual. It is through an analysis of the 
legal discourse, other discursive formations and the regulation of body alteration that 
Bennett seeks to expose and challenge the operational techniques which legitimise 
some bodies and alterations while marginalising others. In doing so he highlights the 
role discourses play in the general functioning of judicial regimes. Once he has set out 
this theoretical framework Bennett proceeds to review different types of body 
alteration focusing on the normalisation of bodies that occurs through the legal 
process.  
One of his most crucial claims concerns the role of medical discourse as ‘the 
single most important legitimating factor’15 in sustaining particular legal positions not 
just (for example) in the context of cosmetic surgery but also in relation to ‘Intersex 
and transsexualism [which] are thoroughly enmeshed within medical discourse’.16 
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) and Male Circumcision (MC) are also subject to a 
similar treatment by medical discourse, which ‘constructs FGM as a source of 
limitless pain’17 while those who oppose MC ‘seem, at times, to attempt to match the 
severity of the constructions of harm associated with FGM’.18 This is achieved 
through the ‘reliance on medical considerations, which conceptualise these body 
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alterations as either harmful or beneficial in purely physical terms’.19 Bennett argues 
that ‘Sole recourse to medical discourse is reductive, as it prevents other 
considerations from being weighed or valued’.20 Similarly, sadomasochism is 
‘discursively constructed as representing the limitless danger that sadists pose to 
masochists’.21 By utilising medical discourse to support legal constructions the law 
enforces a reductive conception of bodies as mere vehicles for physical sensations – 
with the law seeking to prevent harmful activities regardless of other non-medical 
factors (such as well-being, self-conception, self expression and social and personal 
identity). 
This shows how ‘authoritative strands of legal discourse construct the 
meanings attached to sadomasochism’22, FGM and MC, intersex and transgender 
individuals, cosmetic surgery and other body alterations on a medico-legal scale of 
pain and harm. In a comment on sex surgeries23, but which is equally applicable to all 
body alterations, Bennett suggests that certain discourses and practises ‘are legalised 
and legitimated by law because they work, like law, to resolve ambiguous bodies into 
(closer) congruence with normative ideas’24 about bodies (particularly medico-legal 
normative ideas). The common theme between Bennett’s analyses of these different 
body alterations is in ‘revealing and demonstrating how discursive conditions produce 
the legality of those alterations’.25 This Bennett does successfully but as he himself 
notes there is a disjunction between law in theory and law in practice. ‘Despite the 
potential technical criminality of some of these body alterations, most of them are not 
typically actively policed or prosecuted’.26 However, Bennett’s point here is showing 
‘that medical discourse is particularly deeply imbricated with legal discourse around 
body alterations’ supporting and sustaining particular legal attitudes towards marginal 
individuals.27 
Bennett concludes that ‘whilst the discursive frameworks surrounding bodies 
and the criminal law may structure the sociolegal reality of the ways in which we 
literally shape ourselves through body alterations, it is important to remember that we 
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have the capacity to shape these frameworks too’.28 This is, by far, the most important 
point Bennett makes after demonstrating the role that authoritative discourses play in 
shaping legal reality. He points out that there is opportunity for change in discursive 
practice. To this end, his book ‘opens up the possibility to envisage these frameworks 
embodying different constructions, different functions and different results’.29 In 
other words, Bennett is trying to bring to mind the options for different legal realities. 
However, he does not suggest how we should select between different legal discursive 
frameworks. 
Without an indication of how to choose (if we are to choose) between different 
discursive frameworks it is unclear how we should respond to the exposure of the role 
of discursive frameworks in law. Does this mean that legal systems should attempt to 
be more liberal or attempt to accommodate different discourses? Should the extent of 
legal regulation be reduced or minimised to prevent the adoption of a particular 
discourse? Some indication about where his analysis takes us in terms of legal 
evolution would have added an additional insight to his work. At the moment we are 
left somewhat adrift regarding how the law should mediate or operate to regulate 
these different discourses, yet some selection procedure seems to be a necessary next 
step for research in this area. Bennett’s analysis exposes the laws reliance on 
particular discursive frameworks to justify the normative positions it enforces and 
points out the existence of alternative discourses but it does not suggest a way to 
navigate between these different discursive realities.  
Furthermore, he relates most of his comments to legal constructions of the 
body so it is unclear whether Bennett’s claims regarding discursive frameworks apply 
to legal systems generally, some or most parts of the law or only in areas subject to a 
great deal of social discussion. For example, the way in which the notion of family is 
articulated would seem to be subject to a similar analysis given the change in to 
s.13(5) Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act from ‘a father’ to ‘supportive 
parenting’.30 The phrase of supportive parenting encompasses alternative 
constructions of family and parenting – single or same-sex parent constructions of 
family and parenting can both fall within supportive parenting. An analysis of the 
discursive construction of family, along the line of Bennett’s analysis, could easily be 
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used in this area demonstrating the wider usefulness of this approach. Nevertheless, 
some hint of Bennett’s thoughts on the role and extent of discourse in other areas of 
law would give us some insight into whether he consider his analysis as a general 
theory of jurisprudence or whether he regards it as specific to body alterations or 
particular area of law. 
It seems that Bennett’s analysis does have general implications for legal 
theory because we are inescapably ensnared in discursive frameworks. No matter the 
area of regulation discourse plays a crucial role in framing and justifying different 
normative positions. Although this may be less obvious in some legal areas than 
others (for example, the technical management of tax law seems less subject to such 
an analysis) discourse can greatly influence how these systems function (notions of 
fair, just, progressive and regressive taxation will play a role in how taxation is 
structured and operates). In more socially orientated yet ethically diverse areas – such 
as health law – the problematic role of discourse will be correspondingly greater. 
Consequently, Bennett’s analysis is applicable to all legal regulation. However, this 
means that the uncertainty introduced in the regulation of body alterations regarding 
the validity of law applies generally in all legal systems. Law may, therefore, face an 
existential crisis in justifying particular normative positions as all legal regimes are 
(merely) competing discourses. Developing a method for designing or selecting 
between different positions thus gains a sense of urgency under this analytical 
approach. 
These comments should not detract from Bennett’s success in achieving his 
stated goal of opening discussion on the role of discourses in law. Exposing how 
discourses affect legal frameworks (in particular how medical discourse is used to 
shore up legal positions) is useful for those seeking to challenge judicial orthodoxy 
and dominant narratives in contemporary debates. Bennett’s book will provide those 
who are marginalised (and their marginalised discourses) with arguments to 
undermine the dominant legal regime and its normative claims by demonstrating that 
the current judicial orthodoxy is but one amongst many possible legal regimes that we 
might live under. This should give us hope that the law may better reflect the diverse 
ways in we live our lives and less often be used to enforce a particular notion of the 
good life. Bennett’s book is an important contribution towards increasing the visibility 
of marginalised legal subjects and highlighting the partisan nature of current judicial 
systems. It should be staple reading for any researcher interested in the methods 
available for challenging legal orthodoxy and exploring alternative legal regimes 
based upon different discursive frameworks. 
